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Irregular migration is increasing in the Caribbean while the opportunities for applying
for asylum hardly exist. The policy regarding most Caribbean irregular migrants is
based on the view of the potential destinations, namely that the migrants are economic
rather than political refugees. Whatever the specific cause of a migrant’s departure, the
movement is rooted in a complex amalgam of political, socioeconomic and
(increasingly) environmental, factors. Thus irregular movements are part of the wider
Caribbean migration process. The irregular movements differ from other forms of
migration in that they represent the informal sector of migration, providing an
alternative to those sectors of national populations that for political or economic reasons
fall outside the immigration categories for entry to the United States. Locations in the
Caribbean largely provide the intended transit stops to the United States, but with the
implementation of policies to interdict migrants at sea, many of these intermediary
locations become final destinations and, ultimately, marginalized communities of the
migrants themselves and successive generations. These centres are the nodal points of
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an established transnational network that sustains the ongoing process of irregular
migration. The economic and emotional cost and risks faced by the migrants are high,
and the economic and political cost and challenges faced by host governments are also
high. Irregular migration and the issue of asylum poignantly reflect various aspects of
poverty and the vast economic disparities that exist within the region. Further, irregular
migration and the question of asylum greatly affect diplomatic relations between
Caribbean countries of migration source and destination. Better and more thoughtful
policies are needed to address the continuing issues relating to irregular migration.1
1 Introduction
Behind the anxiety relating to refugees and asylum seekers lies the issue of irregular
migration. As with regular migration, irregular relocation in the Caribbean includes
different types of movement. One is the illegal entry into the Caribbean of persons from
other regions. Currently, such immigrants are chiefly from China, entering the
Caribbean countries with the intention of moving onto the United States (US). A second
type of irregular migrant leaves from the Caribbean countries direct to destinations
outside the region, mainly the US, Canada and countries in Europe. Finally, a third type
of irregular migrant originates in the Caribbean and moves to other locations within the
region. Thus, irregular relocation affecting the Caribbean concerns both immigrant and
emigrant, and is both intra- and extra-regional with regard to the source and destination
of movement. In general, irregular migration parallels the patterns of regular migration
flows, and could be considered to represent the ‘informal sector’ of the migration
process.
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, migration for the Caribbean people has
evolved as the major avenue of upward mobility for the accumulation of capital, both
financial and social. At the present time, the propensity for migration remains high and
there is an active search for, and responsiveness to, the opportunities for relocation,
whenever and wherever they occur. At times these opportunities have come from within
the region itself or from the wider circum-Caribbean region, as in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries; in more recent times, from North America and Europe.
As in many other parts of the world, irregular migration is increasing in the Caribbean.
Migration continues to be identified by most Caribbean societies as the only alternative
to the existing conditions in one’s home country. These range from minor frustrations or
insecurities to major hardships and breach of human rights. In addition, ‘migrant’
communities have already been established at the destinations of earlier movements of
people and these provide the means for re-unification of families and the support needed
to survive on arrival in the host country. This creates an important aspect of the
dynamics that perpetuates the migration process. Under dire circumstances, and as legal
channels for entry into potential immigration countries (particularly those in North
America and Europe) remain selective on grounds of nationality, education and
occupational status, there is likely to be a continuing flow of migrants trying to
circumvent formal channels by resorting to informal ones.
Irregular migration itself creates its own dynamics. The successive waves of migrants
departing from communities and relatively small countries have a destabilizing effect
that exacerbates poor confidence in the system, and lowers morale. The situation is
worsened dramatically by the boat-loads of people being repatriated. Instead of
deterring further emigration, forced repatriation only feeds the sense of urgency to leave
at any cost.
There are various means for migrating outside the official system, but unfortunately
many migrants, whether inadvertently or knowingly, become caught up in the web of
trafficking and smuggling rings that operate within the region. This entangles irregular
migration in a complex system of illegal activity with implications extending beyond
the specific issue of migration.2
This paper gives an overview of irregular migration with respect to the Caribbean, with
particular reference to the patterns of movement, its short-term implications, as well as
the wider underlying issues. This will be preceded by a brief outline of irregular
migration in the Caribbean context.
2 Caribbean irregular migration in context
Migration has been of major significance in the making and development of the
Caribbean. Present-day Caribbean societies were largely formed through immigration,
both forced and free. Subsequently, emigration has played an increasingly important
role, with continuing and overlapping episodes of emigration within the wider
Caribbean, and also to other regions, notably Europe and North America.
Substantial Caribbean communities have become established at all the major relocation
destinations. At the same time, there have always been currents of return migration to
respective home countries and circular movement between countries. Migrants and their
home communities have adopted livelihood strategies that over time have become
transnational in character due to the associated flows of people, information, goods and
finance. Guest worker programmes have also provided work for migrants both in
agricultural harvesting and the hotel industry in the US and Canada. These activities
provided the channel for the movement of large numbers of workers on a regular,
seasonal basis.
The guest worker schemes have been arranged through bilateral arrangements between
source and host governments. In some cases, the government of the sending country has
been reimbursed by the government of the receiving country. For example, for many
years, the Dominican Republic paid the Haitian government for access to the Haitian
labourforce. Specifically, in 1980 US$2.9 million was paid for 16,000 workers
(braceros) (French 1991 cited in Castles and Miller 1998) but this arrangement lapsed
in 1986 after Francois Duvalier (Baby Doc) was forced out of office. Since then, the
sugar industry in the Dominican Republic has relied on private recruiters to find the
estimated 40,000 workers needed each year from November to May for harvesting
(Preeg 1985; Castles and Miller 1998).
A number of overlapping movements also occur: Haitians go to cut cane in the
Dominican Republic, while Dominicans go to other locations in the Caribbean and to
the US. Haitians and Dominicans are the largest and second largest groups of Caribbean
emigrants both with respect to intro-regional and extra-regional movements (see, for
example, Marshall 1979). Vincentians have traditionally travelled to Barbados to cut
cane (Marshall 1984), and Barbadians, along with Jamaicans, have gone to Florida or to
other parts of the US and Canada for fruit and tobacco harvesting (McCoy and Wood
1982). Variations in migration flow, including the volume, characteristics of the
migrants, purpose and strategies for achieving individual aims, are numerous.
Furthermore, legal controls for managing these movements of people either by
encouragement or deterrent in the countries of origin and destination, have differed
considerably. Migrations have also varied with regard to the duration of the stay abroad
and in the timing of movements between source and destination. In addition to long-stay
migration, many movements have been transient in nature, with people engaged in
varied forms of formal and informal business activities and trade. People return and3
leave again, establishing transnational communities between which there is ongoing
movement of people, capital and goods.
Just as the characteristics of the movements have varied greatly, so have the reasons for
migration. But the underlying explanations have remained fundamentally the same and
have become reinforced with every passing generation (Thomas-Hope 1992, 1999).
Following the emancipation of slaves throughout the nineteenth century (with the
exception of Haiti where slaves freed themselves in a revolutionary upheaval at the end
of the eighteenth century), migration was closely associated with the flight of ex-slaves
from plantations and the pursuit of full liberty from the plantation system that had
dominated every facet of national life and individual livelihood. Movements continued
throughout the twentieth century, increasing in volume from different Caribbean
countries in successive decades, albeit continually changing in character over time.
In addition to migration being associated with the desire to escape the plantation system
and the traditional constraints in favour of upward mobility in post-colonial societies,
small Caribbean countries have only limited physical and environmental resources.
Other factors have contributed to the destabilization of many Caribbean societies since
the 1980s, including poor economic performance, indebtedness to the international
banks (particularly the World Bank and the IMF), demographic imbalance and major
rural-urban shifts. In other countries of the region, notably Haiti, political instability and
environmental disaster have added to the negative development (Castles and Miller
1998). Countries that have been spared this negative development in the second half of
the twentieth century, have become the net receivers, rather than senders of both regular
and irregular migrants. Thus, migration—by extending options and opportunities to a
wider regional and global context—offered the people the means to elude conditions
that range from restrictions on upward mobility to major hardship or abhorrent
circumstances, including violence or its threat.
The dynamics of migration reflects the interplay of international, national, household
and personal factors. People of all social classes migrate, but the international economic
order and the division of labour, in conjunction with the level of social and physical
capacity for absorption of specific island populations, create the conditions in which
legislative control and inducement to the movement of labour across national borders
are formulated and implemented. Economic, social, demographic and political realities
as well as the perception of these influence immigration regulations and legislation, and
thus determine people’s access to migration. These same factors subsequently condition
the method and process of entry of different national or ethnic groups into the ‘host’
society, and also affect the impact that migration has at destination.
Contrary to the simplistic explanations often advanced, migration is not a passive
reaction to internal ‘push’ or external ‘pull’ forces. Likewise, irregular migration
usually is not a simple process of crossing international borders according to the
migrants’ own volition. International decisions influence migration flows in a number of
direct and indirect ways and, within the wider international and national context,
migration is a part of a dynamic set of negotiations at all levels. Based on various geo-
political motivations, nation states negotiate for the movement of labour through official
or unofficial channels. This is evident in the comparative reception by the US of Cubans
granted asylum on political grounds versus Haitians who, on economic grounds, were
refused (Boyle et al. 1998). While there is no formal negotiation with respect to refugee4
and other irregular movements, various subtle mechanisms are used by the ‘sending’
country to exert pressure on other states to receive their nationals.
Thus ‘forced migration’ should not be conceptualized as necessarily the result of
specific persecution that literally causes people to flee for their lives. Forced migration
may also result from the institutional structure of the social, economic and political
systems that make peaceful sustaining of life and livelihood impossible (Goodwill-Gill
1990; Hammar et al. 1997).
This can occur in combination with de facto circumstances whereby segments of the
population, who cannot for one reason or another be ‘managed’ in or by the existing
socioeconomic and/or political regime, are driven out or allowed to leave without
hindrance to seek residence elsewhere. Thus, as a result of all levels of negotiation—
‘free’ movement or refugee, formal or informal—there is a selective process of overt or
covert negotiation that operates at the interface of the needs of the immigration country
on the one hand and the potential for migration in the emigration country on the other.
Ranging from the macro-level forces of global economic and political systems to the
micro-level strategies and ambitions of the household and individual, there exists a
variety of societal imperatives, perceptions and interactions that translate into the
opportunities and tensions that trigger migration flows. Among these are the conditions
that formally qualify an individual for passage across international borders, and are
largely articulated in the criteria for entry that are established by prospective destination
countries.
The criteria for gaining immigration priority status generally lead to the
disproportionate selection of the educated, highly skilled and the young to the exclusion
of others. An exception is the criterion of a ‘dependent relative’ of an existing resident.
It is to be noted that recruitment campaigns are periodically mounted by North
American and European countries to attract select migrants, of late specifically students,
teachers and nurses.
In addition to those with criminal records who are automatically excluded, people from
countries that are considered low-priority sources of entrants to North America, Europe
or even other neighbouring Caribbean countries, generally do not meet the selection
requirement for formal entry and landed immigrant status. Invariably, countries ranked
with the lowest priority for immigration of nationals are the poorest and within those
countries,  the poorest and least educated sectors of the population are the least favoured
groups. It is precisely from these countries that the motivation to emigrate is the
greatest. The adverse perception of which they are victim is based on a number of
factors generally associated with race and/or poverty. The negative image is also
compounded by the very existence of irregular movement itself. Thus, where people
cross national borders without the sanction of the authorities or the formal
socioeconomic system or in excess of the environmental carrying capacity, it increases
resistance in the host societies.
Irregular migration itself creates anxiety, sometimes bordering on hysteria, in the
receiving countries that results in the formulation of new regulations or the more
stringent enforcement of existing regulations in efforts to reduce the number of further
immigrants. The concern might be well-founded in very small island states, because in
all possibility the flow of people could exceed the capacity of the destination to absorb5
and settle the new population within the time-frame of migrant entry. After initial
concern, long-term xenophobia follows. There is the danger of politicians exploiting or
responding to public anxiety and hurriedly formulating poorly conceived policies and
short-term decisions.
3 Trends in Caribbean irregular migration
3.1 The pattern of movement
The direction and volume of irregular movements reflect two interrelated hierarchies of
opportunity based upon economic conditions and distance. At one level, irregular
migrants constitute the materially poor from the poorest countries to other nations
within the Caribbean, and affect destinations within the shortest distances from the point
of origin, as financial costs are generally commensurately lower for these places than
more distant locations.
In addition to transport costs, opportunity cost is highest for the US. The risk of being
intercepted is lower in those countries of the region that can afford only rudimentary
coastguard surveillance. For example, entry into the Turks and Caicos Islands since
1994 has been relatively easier than into the Bahamas. In other territories where there is
cooperation with the US Coastguard, surveillance is tight, as is the case for the US
Virgin Islands and through extended mutual cooperation, also in the British Virgin
Islands. The selection of a destination, therefore, reflects a compromise on the part of
the migrant between lower risk and costs versus preferred location.
The main flows of irregular migration are given below. (See also Figure 1.)
3.1.1 Immigrants from outside the region
Most irregular migrants moving into the Caribbean are currently from China. During
recent years, an estimated 200,000 Chinese migrants are smuggled annually by
organized rings and syndicates into the area, including the US. Many of those destined
for the US are landed first in the Caribbean, especially the islands of the eastern
Caribbean or in Central America for later attempts to reach the US (CNN 2001).
3.1.2 From the Caribbean to North America and Europe using formal routes
Migrants move from Caribbean countries to the US and the European Union (EU) direct
or via transit points (some of which become their final destinations). Regular airline
routes and the use of false documents provide the means of entry. In recent years, major
movements of this type have been from Jamaica to the US direct or via the UK or
Canada. Regular airline flights are used. A second but similar corridor is from southern
Caribbean through Trinidad, and then to the US and/or the UK.
3.1.3 Land border crossings
With respect to irregular migration, the only land border of relevance in the Caribbean
is between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This has been a long-standing crossing
point for large numbers of regular as well as undocumented irregular migrants such as
the seasonal workers who obtain employment in the sugar-cane harvest in the
Dominican Republic. Some of these remain legally or illegally in the DominicanFigure 1
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Republic. On the part of Haitians, the seasonal movement across the border into
Dominican Republic and the illegal extension of stay continue even today.
3.1.4 Irregular movements by boat
Currently, the main issue relating to irregular migration in the Caribbean, chiefly
because of the large numbers involved, are the migrants who attempt to enter the US or
a second Caribbean country, invariably by boat. The boats are undocumented and in
many cases operated by smuggling rings. Large boats are usually used if direct travel to
the US is intended, but to reduce the risk of being observed and intercepted by the
Coastguard, the final leg of the journey is made in small boats, usually from
archipelagos of the Bahamian, or Turks and Caicos Islands. Much smaller numbers of
Haitians and Cubans travel by sea to Jamaica or Cayman and attempt to move from
there to the US later.
Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the sources for these irregular movements.
Haitians chiefly travel to the Bahamas or the Turks and Caicos Islands almost always
with the intention of relocating to the US, while Cubans prefer to travel directly to
Florida.
Haitians and Dominicans also travel eastwards to islands having a prosperous tourist
industry, such as Antigua, or to the British Overseas Territory of Anguilla, or the French
Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, including their off-shore islands, Marie
Galante and the Iles des Saintes. The British, Dutch and French colonial territories in
the Caribbean are linked to the EU, and thus their economies are supported. Here,
opportunities are better and the possibility of moving onto Europe exists. Attempts to
enter the British Virgin Islands are rare because of the intense surveillance of the US
Coastguard based in the US Virgin Islands.
The route of irregular migrants from the Dominican Republic has traditionally been—
and continues to be—across the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico with the aim of moving
onto the US. More recently, there has been movement from the Dominican Republic to
the various Eastern Caribbean islands that could, in the eyes of the migrants, later
provide possibilities for entry either to the US or the EU. This movement is also
characterized by smuggling rings involved in the trafficking of young women and girls
destined for prostitution at locations in the Caribbean itself, especially in the former
Netherlands Antilles, or in Europe (Kempadoo 1999).
In the south-eastern part of the Caribbean, there is small but significant (compared to
the size of the countries concerned) movement from Guyana, Grenada, St Vincent and
the Grenadines and Dominica into Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados.
3.2 The volume of irregular migration
By virtue of the nature of irregular migration, there are no hard data on the number of
illegal migrants in the countries of destination or transit. Relevant countries of entry
collect data on the numbers of persons caught, detained or deported. Rough estimates
are also made of the number of migrants who actually land at their various destinations,
but there are no statistics available on illegal entry into the islands of the Eastern
Caribbean.8
The numbers believed to be involved in the movement destined, either directly or
through transit points, for the US are given in Table 1, which indicates that the Haitians
dominated the overall numbers of irregular migrants from 1982 to 1994. After 1994,
there was a dramatic increase in the numbers of Dominicans interdicted and from 1995
to 2002 they greatly exceeded the number of the Haitians. Between 1991-94, the
number of Cubans interdicted was also much higher than previously recorded.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Bahamas and the authorities in the Turks and
Caicos Islands also maintain records of irregular migrants apprehended by the security
forces. The former reported that in 2000, 4,879 Haitians were intercepted, 6,253 in
2001, and during the first eight months of the current year, 4,077 Haitians have been
detained (Bahamian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unpublished data 2002).
In what is fast becoming a typical news story, the Jamaican Press reported in August
2002 that ‘the Bahamian authorities had detained 204 Haitian migrants who were found
crowded aboard a 40-foot sloop at sea in the southeastern Bahamas’ (The Daily
Observer [Jamaica] 14 August 2002: 16). The migrants were taken by the Coastguard to
a location on the southern island of Inagua, where they were handed over to
immigration authorities for processing and repatriation. In all cases, the majority of
migrants were male, with less than 20 per cent female.
Over the same period, authorities for Turks and Caicos Islands apprehended 806 people
in 2000, 2,038 in 2001 and 845 during January to July 2002 (Turks and Caicos Islands,
unpublished data 2002). Although much smaller in scale, the trend of increasing volume
Table 1
Migrants interdicted at sea calendar year 1982-91
Countries 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Haiti 193 762 2,942 2,411 3,388 3,541 4,614 3,737 1,124 10,087
Dominican Republic 0 76 146 123 166 71 400 701 1,246 1,455
Cuba 0 47 23 37 27 44 63 368 430 1,936
P. R. of China 0 0 0 12 11 0 0 5 0 138
M e x i c o 02011 1 1 3 0100
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 5 37 177 74 38 13 5 95 58 174
TOTAL 198 924 3,288 2,658 3,631 3,680 5,112 4,907 2,858 13,790
Calendar years 1992-2002
Countries 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Haiti 31,438 2,404 25,069 2,336 733 774 1,437 480 1,394 1,956 628
Dominican Republic 436 600 810 4,047 5,430 1,143 831 531 781 279 53
Cuba 2,336 3,687 37,191 617 391 394 1,118 1,463 928 777 419
P. R. of China 181 2,511 353 447 189 112 212 1,351 2 64 69
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 166 37 7 32
Ecuador 0 0 0 2000 5 1 3 1 , 0 2 9 1 , 0 2 0 1 , 3 7 7
O t h e r 4 85 8 35 13 72 84 21 94 63 34 3
TOTAL 34,439 9,260 63,426 7,500 6,780 2,451 3,697 4,523 4217 4,136 2,621
Source: Alien Migrant Interdiction (2002).9
is similar to that seen all over the region. Whether these increases in apprehension
represent greater vigilance by the authorities or whether they reflect an increase in the
volume of flow of Haitian irregular migrants, is a question that is not easy to answer.
3.3 Strategies relating to irregular migration
3.3.1 The strategies of the migrants
From the viewpoint of the receiving country, irregular migration occurs in three ways:
(i) migrants entering legally, but without fulfilling the terms of their entry permit or visa
and simply ‘disappearing’ into the country; (ii) those who enter through the regular
channels with illegal documentation; and (iii) those who enter by crossing the border
illegally. The pattern of movement and the countries that are the principal sources or
destinations of migration are generally the same for regular, formal movements and for
irregular movements. Irregular migration thus represents the ‘informal sector’ of the
migration process.
From the viewpoint of the Caribbean sending countries, the problem is that
governments are not very interested in curbing emigration and, even if they were, the
problem of control seems insurmountable. Caribbean island states have long, heavily
indented and poorly patrolled coastlines, offering many potential points for landing
small craft. The movements usually involve relatively short distances (albeit at times in
dangerous conditions), to the remoter locations of neighbouring countries. Travel can be
a single journey from one territory to another or involve multiple stages, combining in
some instances formal airline routes with informal sea travel.
3.3.2The countries of migrant destination and asylum
Haitians who began to leave their country in large numbers for the US during the 1970s
until 1994 did not have the same preferential opportunities for asylum. Their attempts to
obtain refugee status in the US became more difficult with the practice of interdiction at
sea in the 1980s. There are still an estimated one million internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in Haiti.
Following the coup in Haiti in 1991 and the dramatic increase in the volume of irregular
migration, migrants interdicted at sea by the US Coastguard were processed as asylum
claimants first on ships and then at the US military base in Guantanamo Bay (GTMO)
in Cuba. Those identified as leaving Haiti for economic reasons as opposed to political
persecution were denied asylum and returned to Haiti. During this time, the camp at
GTMO was operating at capacity, with more than 12,000 migrants (Alien Migrant
Interdiction 2002), after which Washington ordered that all other interdicted persons be
summarily repatriated without recourse to seek asylum.
In response to the mass migration of Cubans in 1980 and the increasing number of
Haitians landing in the US, President Reagan issued on 29 September 1981 Presidential
Proclamation No. 4865 which suspended the entry to the US of undocumented migrants
from the high seas. Since then, the American strategy has been to interdict irregular
migrants at sea before they land in the US, and this practice became intensified with the
Haitian ‘boat people’ in 1991, after the coup and overthrow of the elected president,
Aristide.10
In 1992, President Bush issued Executive Order 12807 which enabled the Coastguard to
enforce the suspension of the entry of undocumented migrants by intercepting them at
sea, and returning them to their country of origin or departure (Alien Migration
Interdiction 2002). In 1993, ‘Operation Able Manner’ was launched with the intent of
concentrating Coastguard patrols in the Windward Passage (between Haiti and Cuba) in
order to interdict Haitian migrants. This continued until a new government took over in
Haiti in 1994. In that year, the Coastguard was involved in a massive operation
responding to the movements first from Haiti and then Cuba. Over 63,000 migrants
were interdicted. At its peak, 17 US Coastguard vessels were patrolling the coast of
Haiti while 38 Coastguard vessels were in the Straits of Florida in connection with
‘Operation Able Vigil’.
Some migrants are intercepted by the US Coastguard in US waters, in the Florida
Straits, and often even in Haitian territorial waters. Others are intercepted in the
Caribbean itself, a situation made easier for the US authorities by virtue of the Shiprider
Agreements to which many Caribbean states are signatories.
In addition to interception at sea, other strategies employed by destination countries,
especially the US, include diplomatic pressure on the countries of origin. This is
exemplified by the case in 1991 of the Haitian ‘boat people’ after the coup, when the
US president announced that its troops would invade Haiti unless the military coup
leaders stepped down in favour of Aristide. The ensuring diplomatic negotiations led to
an agreement; 20,000 American troops landed in Haiti, and a few weeks later, Cedras,
the rebel leader resigned (Weiner 1995). This high-level response demonstrates the
seriousness of the security risk, as perceived by US in the continued arrival of large
numbers of irregular migrants seeking asylum. Within the very small states in the
Caribbean, the notion of sovereignty and possible threats to this are ever present.
The negative response to the refugee crisis in the region has been strongest on the part
of the US, but the rest of the Caribbean has reacted similarly within their respective
capabilities. The US Coastguard assists to interdict migrants in the territorial waters of
the Caribbean sovereign states (as agreed under the terms of the Shiprider Agreement).
In particular, the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands, which are the principal
Caribbean destinations of irregular migrants from Haiti, offer no asylum. The
authorities of these countries—the Bahamas, an independent state, and the Turks and
Caicos Islands, a dependent territory of the UK—prefer interception at sea, police
round-up raids, and detainment and later repatriation.
3.4 Migrant communities, transnational environments and social capital
Substantial communities of migrants—mostly of Cubans, Haitians, Dominicans,
Jamaicans and Trinidadians—exist at the destination points of the major movements in
the Caribbean, US, Canada and EU states. Significant Haitian communities also exist in
the Bahamas (see Marshall 1984), and in the Turks and Caicos Islands. Newer
communities of Dominican migrants have developed in the Turks and Caicos Islands as
well as in the north-eastern Caribbean islands of St Martin (US segment of the
territory), and Anguilla (a British dependent territory). These communities form the
system of networks that provide the social capital that is invaluable for the protection
and assistance needed for surviving at destination, obtaining legal status or finding
opportunities to move onto the US.11
The transnational experience is not spatially delineated but creates transmigrant
perspectives of one’s personal world and options, self-identity included. It has been
suggested that in the Haitian case, migrants have yet to fully articulate an identity that
reflects their transnationalism (Schiller and Fouron 1999), while others state that, ‘They
have created no language or identity that gives full voice to the complexity of their daily
lives’ (Basch et al. 1994: 146).
3.5 The status of irregular migrants and the next generation
The status of migrants is largely determined by the mode of entry and policies relating
to asylum, residency and citizenship.
Irregular flows include:
−   Those that move illegally across borders, including asylum seekers who are not
deemed to be ‘genuine refugees’ (Castles and Miller 1998: 289);
−   Those who enter legally but over-extend the limits of their visas; and
−   Persons whose residency or citizenship status is altered through changes in the
laws and regulations governing the criteria for legal status.
Changes in the laws and regulations governing citizenship and rights to work and
residency can suddenly change the status of a person without the individual departing or
entering the country. This action by governments is particularly questionable when it
concerns changes in the status of individuals who have legally resided for years in a
country or those whose children have been born in the host country, then suddenly find
themselves dramatically affected by new regulations governing the renewal of work
permits or determining the citizenship of the children of immigrants. Usually citizenship
is granted to an individual according to the country of birth, but this can vary,
depending on the regulations outlining the rights of either the father or mother to
transfer citizenship to the child.
In 1991, following democratic elections in Haiti and growing concerns about the human
rights of the Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican government
expulsed more than 10,000 Haitians, many of whom had lived for years in the country
or had been born there (French 1991: 15 cited in Castles and Miller 1993: 137). Further
political events in Haiti, in particular the overthrow of Aristide in September 1991, led
to a renewed emigration of Haitians attempting to reach the US. Most were intercepted,
detained and finally deported to Haiti.
The problem of stateless children has arisen in Anguilla and in the Turks and Caicos
Islands in recent years. In July 2002, the issue became a scandal when the children of
Haitian parents but born in the Turks and Caicos Islands were threatened with expulsion
(termed ‘repatriation’) to Haiti. According to unofficial sources, some children had
actually been sent back, but were returned by the authorities on grounds that they were
not Haitian citizens. The children demonstrated with placards, using the publicity given
to a protected species of reptile, the iguanas, which had been dubbed as ‘belongers’, in
order to encourage their protection. The children of Haitian parents born in the same12
islands were now considered ‘non-belongers’ and subsequently were in danger being
expulsed.
Irregular migrants may regularize their residency in a country by applying for and
receiving asylum; being granted a work permit, or obtaining the right to apply for
citizenship through marriage with a national. These regulations can be changed at any
time by the host government. Work permits and their annual renewal can cost a
significant sum of money in relation to the low-level jobs of  the irregular migrants.
Furthermore, there is no transparency in the process so that work permits can be denied
on any grounds without recourse to impartial investigation. The same concerns
citizenship status; once applied for, it can be denied or finally granted after a protracted
period of several years. The overall issues of migrants legalizing their status is not
consistent from one country to another; there is no transparent process, and it is costly
and subject to revision at any time.
4 Implications of the movements
4.1 Cost to the migrants
The cost of illegal relocation to the migrant is financial as well as physical and
emotional. Travel by sea is usually by private boats invariably operated by those
engaged in human-trafficking and drug-smuggling activities. These are not concerned
with safety regulations and place their passengers in danger, both from the natural
elements and the law. The risks and the costs are high, even though they are generally
undertaken with the full knowledge of the migrants themselves.
4.1.1Financial cost
The financial cost of irregular migration involves payments made for the journey from
the home country to destination and for the documents needed for entry into the
destination country. Usually these services can be secured only at extortionate rates. In
the early 1990s, fraudulent US visas were available in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
at a cost ranging from US$300 to US$5,000, respectively (IMP 2001). In addition, there
are often a number of indirect costs involved to ensure the means of remaining at
destination. These may include a series of payments to cover anything from the
arrangement of a bogus marriage to a work permit.
4.1.2Physical and emotional cost
In all respects, migrants are highly vulnerable to the risk of official sanction
(deportation or detention) as well as the risk of extortion and violence at the hands of
smugglers and other agents with whom they enter into negotiations with regard to the
movement.
In addition, individual opportunists prey on vulnerable migrants, transporting them in
ill-equipped vessels to locations that are neither safe havens nor even the countries
sought by the migrants. Stories abound of the total disregard for the safety or humanity
of the irregular migrants who have been left stranded in small crafts at sea after paying
large sums of money for passage to some agreed destination. As illicit landings
invariably take place at night, many migrants have been led to believe that they had13
landed in the US only to discover later that they were on some uninhabited island in the
Caribbean.
The risks to which the migrants are exposed are evidenced by the number of casualties
recorded. The story in 1981 of the bodies of thirty Haitian migrants being washed
ashore on Hillsboro Beach, Florida, cannot be regarded as an isolated incident (Alien
Migrant Interdiction 2002). With increasing occurrence in the Caribbean, as elsewhere
in the world, people seeking migration opportunities have found themselves victims of
international traffickers engaged in the sex industry, being forced into prostitution at the
destination.
4.2 Cost to the countries of destination
4.2.1Financial cost
Border controls and surveillance for the purpose of indicting irregular migrants at sea
are a significant cost to countries trying to control irregular migration. But, should the
migrant succeed in landing, the costs are much greater for deportation to the country of
origin or social security support.
4.2.2Security
There are relatively small, but significant groups engaged in smuggling, trafficking and
other criminal activity, who travel within and outside of the Caribbean to North
America and Europe in pursuit of these illegal activities. In some cases, they are
criminals and pose a threat to the countries in which they operate. Another group linked
to criminality are the irregular migrants who, although without any prior criminal
record, are forced by their impoverished economic and marginal social position at the
transit location to become involved with the local criminal elements in an effort to
survive before moving to their final destination. Transporters of irregular migrants,
some of whom are a part of organized criminal and well-armed gangs, also pose a
security risk on the high seas as well as within the states where they operate.
4.3 Inclusion  of irregular migrants into society at the destination
The migrants, who reach a transit country, must then negotiate with compatriots and
other local residents for food, shelter and the means of obtaining a niche in the local
economic and ethnic system. Finally, if onward migration is the goal, further
negotiations must be effected, involving more ‘middle men’ at each stage of the
process. At each level of negotiation, the irregular migrant is vulnerable to extortion and
abuse. They also experience problems specifically associated with their irregular
migrant status, especially in terms of access to housing, medical and social services.
4.3.1Health
The illegal status of the migrants at destination means poor or non-access to services, in
particular medical services. Besides, the living conditions of illegal migrants lead to
increased health risks, especially with regard to infections and sexually transmitted
diseases.14
There is a high rate of HIV Aids and tuberculosis in Haiti (UNDP 2000). In the Turks
and Caicos Islands, people applying for a work permit, which is re-issued annually at
varying costs, are subjected to a blood test. The work permit can be declined at any
stage, based on the allegation (true or otherwise) that the individual’s blood is ‘not
clean’. However, the fact that an immigrant seeking a work permit would be deported if
found to be infected with HIV, tuberculosis or any other disease, serves to drive these
individuals ‘underground’. They remain untreated and pose a greater health risk to
society than if the matter were dealt with openly.
4.3.2Environment
The harmful effects of the journey are compounded by the equally unhealthy conditions
in which many of the migrants are forced to live on arrival at destination. They must
remain under cover until they can regularize their status, and illegal migrants ‘live
rough’ without proper sanitation or clean water, and without adequate food. Others
crowd-in with friends and relatives who have legalized their resident status by obtaining
work permits. Thus areas associated with migrant communities tend to comprise both
legal and illegal residents. Invariably, these areas become environmentally degraded,
adding to the unhealthy living standards of the migrants themselves and to the prejudice
against them.
4.3.3Xenophobia and the image of the irregular migrant
Irregular migrants, in addition to being the victims of circumstances, usually also
become the victims of negative societal attitude at destination, and this contributes to
the development of a vicious cycle of unfortunate events.
As discussed by Marmora (1999), the xenophobic attitude toward foreigners is no new
phenomenon. Underlying prejudice can manifest as violence or latent prejudice. Such
feelings are based on cultural or ethnic differences within a society and become evident
only under stress, for example, in situations of competition or perceived competition for
jobs and services. These negative manifestations become part of the normal behaviour
of one sector of the society towards another and are generally tolerated by all. They may
be based on negative feelings towards the ‘outsider’, the fear of losing privileges that
stems from individual insecurity about one’s own racial or social or economic standing.
Black racial characteristics and poverty produce xenophobic attitude toward the
Haitians by people who themselves are black and attempting to rise from poverty. The
prejudice invariably represents a subconscious fear of the status or ideals of society
being jeopardized or at least compromised.
The xenophobic picture of the migrant groups easily becomes institutionalized in the
host society’s efforts to ‘manage’ these groups, and to establish policies to control their
numbers and their privileges. Thus, the distinction of the migrant groups may never
fade, nor will their low social status improve. This phenomenon is reflected in the
terminology—the belongers and non-belongers—used in the Turks and Caicos Islands
to distinguish ‘true Turks’ from Haitians, even second and third generation Haitians.
The effort to maintain the distinction is further reflected in the fact that it is not common
for Turks and Caicos Islanders and Haitians to inter-marry or have children together.
In stark contrast are the attitudes and behaviour of the Turks and Caicos Islanders
towards the Dominicans, who are perceived to posses attractive ‘Latin’ physical
characteristics because of their mulatto or mestizo heritage. Dominican migrant women15
are favoured for ‘front desk’ positions or in bars, clubs and restaurants to attract
clientele. They are sought after by male Turks and Caicos islanders as lovers and the
mothers of their children, who are then likely to be less Negroid in looks than their
fathers. This behaviour has been tolerated at various levels of the society and the non-
Negroid image of physical attractiveness has become reinforced. These images and
perspectives become articulated, consciously or subconsciously, in society and impact
on policy; anti-immigration policies are applied to certain groups, while others are
favoured with pro-immigrant policies.
Of all the countries in the region, Haiti is the most impoverished economically,
politically and environmentally. The irony is that because of this degradation, it is also
the country with the least opportunities for legal or formal migration. Moreover, the
persisting episodes of both regular and irregular migration contribute to the continued
destabilization of Haitian society and economy. The migrants themselves, even those
who fail, feed the dynamics for future  flows, perpetuating the process.
5 The wider issues: poverty and irregular migration
Although the selection criteria for regular emigration are complex and are not solely
determined by simple economic or political forces, countries with the largest regular
emigration are also the same as those with the highest rates of irregular emigration.
Over the 1980s and 1990s, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Grenada,
St Vincent and St Kitts-Nevis experienced high net emigration, all with 15 per cent or
more of the population emigrating in the 1991-92 fiscal year (CCPHC 1994). The
countries with net immigration are the US Virgin Islands and, in the 1990s, Antigua-
Barbuda. The British Virgin Islands and Antigua have experienced high emigration
levels but these have been exceeded by high immigration levels as well, accounting for
26 per cent and 42 per cent of their populations, respectively.
GDP figures for selected Caribbean countries demonstrate the large divergence within
the region. The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, the US Virgin Islands and
Barbados are the countries receiving the greatest volumes of both regular and irregular
migrants. The main sources of both regular and irregular migrants are Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Guyana. While the GDP per capita for the Bahamas
in 1998 was US$14,614, it was US$4,597 for the Dominican Republic, less than
US$4,000 for Jamaica and Guyana, and less than US$2,000 for Haiti (Table 2). The
Table 2
GDP (per capita) in selected countries
Year Bahamas Guyana Jamaica Haiti Dominican Republic
1975 3,822.88 1,473.96 1,641.35 776.77 1,244.85
1980 8,735.99 1,951.29 1,880.00 1,339.76 1,990.20
1985 10,937.83 1,819.56 2,051.76 1,388.86 2,386.42
1990 14,225.94 2,036.97 3,166.71 1,603.40 3,122.04
1995 14,638.68 3,163.01 3,619.18 1,409.78 3,997.77
1998 14,614.10 3,402.94 3,388.88 1,383.25 4,597.50
Source: World Bank (2000).16
discrepancy in the GDP rates had increased progressively over the last 25 years between
certain Caribbean such as the Bahamas and others, such as Haiti, the Dominican
Republic and Jamaica (Figure 2). Thus, the contrast between the economic levels of the
major countries of emigration (regular and irregular) and immigration within the
Caribbean is very great.
The disparities between the Caribbean countries in their material living standards can
also be indicated by measures of human poverty (Table 3). Haiti is worse off by far with
a poverty index in excess of 46, ranking it 71st in the global order. Even in Caribbean
terms, this is alarming since the next highest poverty index is recorded for the
Dominican Republic at a value of 20 per cent and 20
th position worldwide (UNDP
2000).
The limited access to basic human goods such as safe water, health services and
sanitation reflects the relatively poor situation of the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.
The situation is similar for Guyana and some of the Eastern Caribbean countries such as
Grenada, St Vincent and Dominica. Above all, these figures confirm the particular
plight of Haiti (Table 3). The low levels of access to sanitation for the Bahamas suggest
an anomaly in light of the otherwise relatively high living standards. This raises
questions about the country’s level of other indicators, and whether these reflect the
disproportionately poorer conditions of the emigrant population. Literacy rates and
school enrolment indicate low levels for Haiti both in absolute and relative terms.
Figure 2

















































































































Source: World Bank (2000).17
Fertility rates recorded in Haiti are the highest for the region as are infant mortality and
maternal mortality rates. Life expectancy and food security are the lowest for the region,
and among the lowest worldwide. These demographic trends indicate an average annual
population growth of 1.6 per cent (the highest in the region) and a young population
(only 3.6 per cent of the population was 65 and over in 1998) who will continue to
reinforce the size of irregular emigrant streams from that country for many years to
come (UNDP 2000).
Finally, in Haiti as a consequence of the political and economic circumstances,
environmental conditions deteriorated progressively throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
exacerbating the migration situation even further. Haitian migrants have already been
described as leaving their homes because their country has become an ‘environmental
basket-case’ (Myers 1993: 189 cited in Black 1998: 24).
Regardless of what indicators are used to measure material and non-material human
circumstances, there can be no doubt about the extent of the disparity that exists
between Caribbean countries. The indicated data confirm the same absolute and relative
picture of the Caribbean region in the global context, and of Haiti in the Caribbean
context. Furthermore, the data reflect factors which cannot be measured by indicators,
such as confidence in the future of one’s country, sense of security and self-esteem, all
of which are desperately low.
Table 3
Human poverty indicators
Barbados Bahamas Cuba Jamaica
Dominican
 Republic Haiti
Human poverty index (HPI-1), 1998
Rank – – 3.0 16.0 20.0 71.0
Value (%) – – 4.6 13.4 20.0 45.2
Adult illiteracy, 1998 – 4.5 3.4 14.0 17.2 26.5
(% age 15 and above)
Population (%) without access to:
Safe water, 1990-98 0 6.0 7.0 14.0 21.0 63.0
Health services, 1981-93 0 0.0 0.0 – – 55.0
Sanitation, 1990-98 0 18.0 34.0 11.0 15.0 75.0
Population (%) below poverty line:
$ 1 a day (1993 PPP US$) – – – 3.2 3.2 –
1987-97 – – – 34.2 20.6 65.0
Source: UNDP (2000).
6 Conclusion
There is no sign of the demand for migration abating in the Caribbean and irregular
movements will certainly continue and possibly increase. The trends show the
emergence of new sources of large numbers of emigrants and new directions of
movement when routes to preferred destination countries become more effectively
blocked. It is evident that the urgent formulation of policies needs to focus not only on
short-term management of irregular migration through increased restrictions and18
policing, but also to prioritize on policies that face the challenge of finding enduring
long-term solutions.
Based on current trends, and barring any sudden, dramatic events, Haiti, the Dominican
Republic and Jamaica (IMP 2001) will most likely continue to be the source of
significant numbers of irregular migrants in the coming decades. Another country of
importance in this regard is Guyana. The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands
constitute at present—and are likely to continue to be—the major transit countries for
Haitians en route to the US, while for the Dominican Republic citizens en route to the
French Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe and thence to mainland Europe,
countries of the eastern Caribbean, such as Dominica and St Lucia will be major
stopping points. Similarly, people from the Dominican Republic and Jamaica will
continue to move to Anguilla, Antigua, St Martin and other islands of the north-east
Caribbean.
6.1 Policy
Policies concerned with the short- and medium-term issues relating to irregular
migration are undoubtedly required. With respect to the Caribbean, these principally
need to address border control management, social stability and national security, and
the costs associated with retaining or deporting persons. But the approach to be adopted
for border management has not been universally agreed. In the first place, monitoring is
required to ensure that countries and their agents abide by the international agreements
concerning the rights and protection of refugees and other persons in need of protection.
Efforts in border management and control of irregular movements must handled with
due regard for the human rights of the individuals concerned. Furthermore, according to
a liberal democratic view, people should not be returned to their home country against
their will. However, there was a dramatic reversal of this approach in the United States’
policy in 1994. At that time, Cubans seeking sanctuary in the US were granted asylum
in return for the Cuban government’s promise to prevent others from leaving the
country (Weiner 1995).
Because of the complexity of the overall pattern of migration, there are implications for
the entire Caribbean region. It is essential, therefore, that arrangements are put in place
that will enhance cooperation between states on migration management. This should
incorporate many aspects of the relocation operation, including the collection of
accurate data on irregular migration and the need to share this information regularly
with other countries in the region. The link between migrant transportation and
smuggling and trafficking rings makes it imperative that bilateral and multilateral
agreements on the intelligence of these operations be strengthened. This would enable
enhancing the network and establishing focal points in each country to strengthen
regional approaches for combating trafficking and smuggling, and for regularly
exchanging information on this issue (IMP 2001).
Regional efforts are not wholeheartedly supported, as each country is potentially at risk
of being negatively impacted by any change in the status quo with regard to regional
migrants and North American immigration regulations. Besides, as efforts are
intensified to curb illegal entries, countries will have to invest more resources into this
effort. Likewise, deportation costs will continue to be a burden on the countries
involved.19
Part of the dynamics and the irony of irregular migration is the need for cheap, unskilled
labour during periods of economic growth. Despite the claims of governments to be
committed to stopping these movements, many of the factors that influence these
movements are to be found in the very interaction that takes place between the countries
of immigration and emigration.
At times, there is demand to curtail immigration in the destination countries. As
political pressure mounts, this leads to pressure being put ultimately on the governments
of the sending countries, as evidenced by the US intervention in Haiti in September
1994. But under normal circumstances the prevailing mood in the destination countries
is less obvious, as illegal migrants and their legal compatriots provide valuable services
in sectors that are shunned by nationals and at wages lower than accepted by nationals.
Their presence will therefore continue to be guarded by those who gain the most from
the continued flows of illegals.
Nevertheless, opportunities available to irregular migrants to escape poverty, and to
improve their economic status at destination are eroded by their illegal status. This
contributes to continued poverty at destination as they are forced to survive at the lowest
margins of existence. Caribbean countries are linked to each other and to North
American countries, not only because of past and present diplomatic relations, but also
because existing migrant communities are connected in the system of transnational
interactions and flows. Should the circumstances of the migrant communities
deteriorate, this would provide additional fuel for national groups to lobby against the
illegals.
The impact of irregular migration on the countries of origin is outside the scope of this
paper. Yet, it is here that efforts for a durable solution must ultimately lie. The problem
of persistent poverty and the international and national structures that reinforce
depredation have to be confronted. A long-term approach must also include
environmental solutions. When countries become as environmentally degraded and
impoverished as Haiti, the implications for migration, whether regular or irregular, will
undoubtedly intensify. Many Haitians are already environmental refugees and this
number is likely to increase exponentially in the future (Alien Migrant Interdiction
2002). Given this fact, the countries of the north will be faced with the challenge that
new waves of asylum seekers claiming environmental refugee status may well be
supported by international lobbyists in their demands.
References
Ahmed, I. (1997). ‘Exit, Voice and Citizenship’ in T. Hammar, G. Brochmann,
K. Tamas, and T. Faist (eds), International Migration, Immobility and Development.
Oxford: Oxford International Publishers, Berg Imprint, 159–219.
Alien Migrant Interdiction (2002). US Coastguard. Available at: www.uscg.mil/hq/g-
l/mle/a,iostats1.htm.
Basch, L., N. G. Schiller, and C. S. Blanc (1994). Nations Unbound. Amsterdam:
Gordon and Breach.
Black, R. (1998). Refugees, Environment and Development. London: Longman.20
Boyle, P., K. Halfacree, and V. Robinson (1998). Exploring Contemporary Migration.
London: Longman.
Castles, S., and M. J. Miller (1998). The Age of Migration: International Movements in
the Modern World. London: Macmillan (second edition).
CCPHC (Caribbean Community Regional Census Office) (1994). Commonwealth
Caribbean Population and Housing Census, 1991. Port of Spain, Trinidad.
CNN.com (2001). ‘Migration on Rise Worldwide’. 2 November.
International Migration Policy Programme (IMP) (2001). ‘Irregular Migration and the
Protection of Refugees and Other Persons in Need of Protection–Summary’.
Background paper, Module 5, presented at The International Migration Policy
Seminar for the Caribbean Region. Geneva: UNFPA, UNITAR, IOM, ILO, 8-9.
Kempadoo, K. (ed.) (1999). Sun, Sex and Gold: Tourism and Sex Work in the
Caribbean. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Marmora, L. (1999). International Migration Policies and Programmes. Geneva:
International Organization for Migration.
Marshall, D. (1979). The Haitian Problem: Illegal Migration to the Bahamas. Kingston:
University of the West Indies, Mona, Institute of Social and Economic Research.
Marshall, D. (1984). ‘Vincentian Contract Labour Migration to Barbados: The
Satisfaction of Mutual Needs?’. Social and Economic Studies, 33: 63-92.
McCoy, T. L., and C. H. Wood (1982). Caribbean Workers in the Florida Sugar Cane
Industry.  Occasional Paper No. 2. Gainesville, FL: Center for Latin American
Studies, University of Florida.
Preeg, E. (1985). ‘Migration and Development in Hispaniola’ in R. Pastor (ed.),
Migration and Development in the Caribbean: The Unexplored Connection. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 140-56.
Schiller, N. G., and G. Fouron (1999). ‘Transnational Lives and National Identities: The
Identity Politics of Haitian Immigrants’ in M. P. Smith, and L. E. Guarnizo (eds),
Transnationalism From Below. New Bruswick: Transaction Publishers.
Thomas-Hope, E. (1992). Explanation in Caribbean Migration: Perception and the
Image – Jamaica, Barbados, St Vincent. London: Macmillan.
Thomas-Hope, E. (1999). ‘Emigration Dynamics in the Anglophone Caribbean’, in
R. Appleyard  (ed.),  Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries Volume III:
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Aldershot: Ashgate, 232-84.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2000). Human Development Report
2000. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weiner, M. (1995). The Global Migration Crisis. New York: Harper Collins.
World Bank (2000). World Development Indicators 2000, CD-rom. Washington DC:
World Bank.